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‘Political gladiators’ on Facebook in Zimbabwe: A discursive analysis of intra-ZANU-PF 
cyber wars; Baba Jukwa versus Amai Jukwa. 
Introduction: Zimbabwe’s 2013 elections, Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa  
The period leading to Zimbabwe’s elections in July 2013, is remembered for the cyber wars 
pitting Facebook characters Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa. Both characters joined Facebook in 
March 2013, with Amai Jukwa being the first to appear. Both characters still existed at the time 
of authoring this paper although the frequency and significance of their Facebook posts had 
largely diminished. Edmund Kudzayi, editor of the state controlled Sunday Mail and his brother 
Phillip were, in 2014 arrested on suspicion that they were among a syndicate of people behind 
the Baba Jukwa page. They  faced and denied charges of “attempting to commit an act of 
insurgency, banditry, sabotage or terrorism, undermining the authority or insulting the 
President and publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the state” (Mathuthu 
2014)1. In the intense media coverage that followed, Mduduzi Mathuthu, editor of the state-
controlled Chronicle claimed that Edmund Kudzayi was Amai Jukwa, not Baba Jukwa. The 
court case is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Amai Jukwa is pro-ZANU-PF whilst Baba Jukwa claims to be a disgruntled ZANU-PF member 
who wanted the party to lose the 2013 elections. Amai Jukwa relentlessly attacked Tsvangirai 
and sometimes took pot-shots at Baba Jukwa, who would immediately retaliate.  Interestingly, 
Baba Jukwa’s popularity saw the emergence of related Facebook pages such as Sahwira 
waBaba Jukwa (Baba Jukwa’s Best Friend) and Sekuru Jukwa (uncle Jukwa). His popularity 
saw him harvesting over 200 000 ‘Likes’ as of July 2013 and becoming a subject of official 
political discussions including at the election manifesto launches of ZANU-PF and MDC-T. 
The two characters emerged in a context characterised by contestations in Zimbabwe’s 
Government of National Unity (GNU)2 over the timing of the elections and calls for security 
sector and media reforms. In this context, criticism of President Robert Mugabe of ZANU - PF 
by the media, opposition politicians and ordinary citizens could be classified as designed to 
engender feelings of hatred and undermine the president in his personal or official capacity 
under Section 33 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 2004. Freedom of 
expression and the press were thus constrained. The context was also characterised by media 
                                                            
1   see http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news‐16466‐Police+release+list+of+Baba+Jukwa+suspects/news.aspx 
2 The GNU combined ZANU (PF), led by Robert Mugabe and MDC‐T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai and MDC led by 
Welshman Ncube 
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reports of factional fighting within ZANU-PF over the succession of 89 year old Mugabe. Some 
sections of the privately-owned media claimed that the various factions battling to succeed 
Mugabe were clandestinely trying to outmanoeuvre each other.  
In this context, Baba Jukwa’s and Amai Jukwa’s entry into politics increased the frenzy and 
speculations surrounding the elections. The two became preferred sources of news. For 
instance, Baba Jukwa received widespread coverage from local and international media 
including BBC, and CNN. The privately-owned pro-opposition NewsDay on July 4 2013 led 
with a story headlined “Baba Jukwa tips Tsvangirai,” based on an online poll conducted by the 
Facebook character, asking his followers whom they would vote for president in the July 31 
election. The outcome of the poll favoured Tsvangirai. The weekly, The Zimbabwean3 which 
is published outside but circulates in the country, also gave Baba Jukwa a column, while the 
state-controlled pro-ZANU PF The Herald gave Amai Jukwa a column. This confirms the 
claim that in some cases (political) bloggers become sources of news for, exert influence on, 
and command more readers than mainstream media (see Hindman’s 2008:2; Papacharissi n.d). 
It also supports the argument that, “online media make it possible for privately-motivated 
individuals to challenge the public agenda”, (Grossman 1995 & Rash 1997 cited by 
Papacharissi n.d). This article explores the discourses of Baba and Amai Jukwa to unravel how 
they challenge, confirm or reproduce the ‘elites’ agendas’. 
The Internet as a double-edged sword 
The internet’s emergence is viewed as having liberated the public sphere due to the sometimes 
anonymous nature of its communication. A public sphere is an arena of public debate which 
crystallizes into public opinion and keeps the elite in check (see Gripsrud 2002; Gerhads & 
Schafer 2009). The emergence of new communication technologies such as the internet has 
reinvigorated the public sphere (Dean 2003) leading many observers to believe that the internet 
makes a better public sphere than traditional media (Gerhards and Schafer 2009). This is 
because traditional media are largely top-down; the elite have privileged access to them while 
the majority do not; and they have been taken over by political and commercial forces (see 
Gerhads & Schafer 2009; Golding & Murdock 2000; Herman & Chomsky 1988; Saunders 
1999; Rusike 1990). In contrast, the internet’s content produced by citizens is less affected by 
“the biases, whims, and market demands which constrain traditional media” (Hindman 
                                                            
3 Wilf Mbanga, the editor and publisher of The Zimbabwean together with his wife Trish are on Zimbabwe 
police’s wanted list in connection with Baba Jukwa. 
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2008:2). However, Dean (2003) argues that, “all interactions are mediated; there is no pure, 
immediate, fully-present, fully-transparent encounter”. There is no reality undiluted by 
mediation (see Fiske 1987; McQuail 2010). Mediation of Internet content by ordinary people 
or citizen journalists is influenced by their beliefs, norms, and values among other things. 
However, this is incomparable to the gatekeeping that goes on at institutional level that is 
influenced by ownership, funding and legal constraints. In internet communication by ordinary 
citizens such legal constraints may be bypassed by assuming a nom de plume. 
Furthermore, the internet provides room for two or multiple way communication previously 
not envisaged with the traditional media (see Papacharissi n.d) and hence broadens and makes 
the public sphere more representative (Hindman 2008). The Internet; unlike traditional media, 
“has the potential to democratize a public sphere which had become increasingly media-
moderated, if not controlled” (Wang & Bates 2008:3). As Gerhards and Schafer (2009:3) note, 
in internet communications structure “gatekeeping journalists and mass media seem to play a 
less important role. Hence, senders may find it easier to present themselves and their issues 
online”. The internet’s liberative potential has further been extended by the emergence of social 
networking sites such as Twitter, Facebook and My Space. These sites present more 
opportunities for free participation by people in debates. As Castells (2007:1) argues, 
 …the development of interactive, horizontal networks of communication has induced the rise of a new 
form of communication, mass-self communication, over the Internet and wireless communication. Under 
these conditions, insurgent politics and social movements are able to intervene more decisively in the 
new communication space.  
The internet provides the public with the opportunity to talk back, to be heard, not only to hear. 
It gives voice to the previously marginalised; they get the opportunity to be heard and 
sometimes to be radicalised, and to communicate with many people who may be displaced in 
time and space but spiritually bound (see Splichal 2010; Chibuwe 2012). 
The internet also provides room for citizen journalism where ‘we are all journalists’ (Allan 
2007). ‘Ordinary’ citizens can simultaneously become producers and consumers (pro-nsumers) 
or ‘actors’ (see Wang & Bates 2008) of content. The mainstream media sometimes use emails, 
videos and stories on blogs by these citizen journalists as in times of crises traditional means 
of sourcing news become difficult. In such cases as Hurricane Katrina and the July 7 2005 
London bombings, mainstream media rely on citizen journalists for information (Allan 2007). 
As a result of its easy accessibility or fewer barriers to entry, “…the internet has made 
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journalists and other elites more accountable; or at least more vulnerable” (Hindman 2008; see 
also Allan 2007; Castells 2007). As the BBC’s Richard Sambrook (2005:5) notes: “News 
organizations are accustomed to being gatekeepers of information. But with Internet’s 
emergence, information has broken free and become commodified and democratized. Such 
change also puts the gatekeeper under spotlight. We are watched and assessed more closely 
now by those whom we serve”.  
Online communication is also “more democratic; [as] the underlying basic structure [of 
internet] treats all users and content similarly” (Wang & Bates 2008:3). It enables ordinary 
citizens to hold the media accountable for their actions unlike before when communication 
used to be only top-down. In today’s digital world, the subaltern can talk back either through 
the media organisations’ discussion forums, Youtube, blogs or other social media. In that 
respect the new communication technologies have liberated consumers from a lifelong role of 
consumption of media content without them being its producers. As a result, media institutions 
are now forced to ‘consume’ and re-mediate what has been produced by the ‘ordinary’ people.  
However, the internet’s liberative potentials are also its potential dangers. For instance the 
internet has resulted in the violation of journalistic ethics since anyone can be a journalist. 
Several governments have expressed concern over the use of the internet by terrorist 
movements to recruit and train followers. The internet’s relative anonymity provides room for 
slander and defamation usually with no room for recourse for the aggrieved. It has been argued 
that the internet gives too much power to too many, sometimes dangerous; people (see Dean 
2003; Hindman 2008; Wang & Bates 2008). Further, “…the openness and freedom of the 
Internet is disruptive, lacking the moderating influence of more traditional channels of political 
discourse” (Wang & Bates 2008:3) and most of the information produced by ordinary citizens 
online is “trivial, silly or wrong”, deceptive and pornographic among other social ills (Wang 
and Bates 2008:5). As Dyson (1998) cited by Dean (2003:100) notes, the internet “allows all 
kinds of people to enter the conversation. There are still reliable and unreliable sources, but for 
now, as people move onto the Net, they tend to lose their common sense and believe all kinds 
of crazy tales and theories”. These arguments are premised on the belief that, once on the 
internet, people adopt a ‘herd instinct,’ reminiscent of the passive audiences postulated in the 
mass society and the magic bullet theories (see McQuail 1994). Bearing in mind that the 
internet’s advantages can also be its disadvantages (see Dean 2003; Hindman 2008; Wang & 
Bates 2008), some governments (including Zimbabwe’s), have enacted laws that legalise 
monitoring or interception of communications that are a threat to national security. 
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Baba Jukwa, Amai Jukwa and Cyber-democracy  
 In a democracy, citizens have a right to; freedom of expression/reason; freedom of assembly 
and; freedom to oppose or support the government (Chipkin 2007; Ake 2000; Hague & Harrop 
2004; Eribo & Jong-Ebot 1997. Freedom of expression arguably leads to societal progress since 
it is through its collusion with error that the livelier perception of truth is realised (Mill cited 
by McQuail 1994). The internet provides both an opportunity for freedom of expression and 
anonymity largely through the use of pseudonyms as in the case of Baba Jukwa and Amai 
Jukwa. The two’s followers remain anonymous by using pseudonyms or simply following 
Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s posts without necessarily ‘Liking’ their pages. As Papacharissi 
(n.d) argues, online media “allow for relative anonymity in personal expression, which could 
lead to empowered and uninhibited public opinion”. The possible effects of anonymity on Baba 
Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s discourses are considered in this paper, vis-à-vis the extent to which 
anonymity afforded by internet influences the subjects of Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s 
discourses.  
 
The research purposively selected and thematically analysed Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s 
posts between May and August 2013. Semiotic analysis and hermeneutics were employed to 
unpack the discourses and graphic representations of the Facebook bloggers.  
Baba and Amai Jukwa: Claimed and symbolic identities 
Although the persons behind Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s Facebook pages remain 
anonymous, their identities are hugely symbolic4. Baba Jukwa’s page can be identified by a 
picture now associated with an infamous visit by senior ZANU-PF/government leaders in 2007 
to Rotina Mavhunga, a Chinhoyi spirit medium who hoaxed them into believing that the 
country was endowed with ‘diesel’ deposits oozing out of a cave situated close to the town. 
The ZANU- PF leaders became a national laughing stock, with labour activist Raymond 
Majongwe composing a musical track Dhiziri kuChinhoyi (diesel at Chinhoyi) in mockery of 
these politicians. 
                                                            
4 Even though the police have arrested Sunday Mail editor Edmund Kudzayi, his brother Phillip and released a 
list of other suspects, Baba Jukwa’s identity still remains a matter of conjecture. It is not clear who ‘he’ really is. 
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The image of the ZANU-PF leaders on Baba Jukwa’s Facebook page is not only comical but 
is in itself a narrative, a ‘parallel discourse’ (Willems 2006) meant to delegitimise and to speak 
back to any vagaries associated with the ZANU- PF regime. The image is a constant reminder 
of the desperation, naivety and gullibility that characterised Zimbabwean leadership during the 
nation’s post-2000 economic crisis. This analysis resonates with Baba Jukwa’s consistent 
portrayal of ZANU- PF as an evil, desperate and dying party. This image would be a painful 
reminder to ZANU- PF of its past failures.  
Inserted below the main image is a caricature of a bald-headed, bearded old man, probably 
symbolic of a griot that tells stories and offers credible advice in traditional African society. 
Assuming that the caricature of a Caucasian man on the profile image represents MDC-T, one 
can see a coincidence with ZANU- PF’s constant accusations that the MDC-T is a party of 
European-backed puppets. Further to the symbolic image on his Facebook page, Baba Jukwa, 
claims to be “everyone”: 
People should understand this without fear; everyone is Baba Jukwa including 
Mr.[President] Mugabe. (Facebook page, 3 July 2013). 
To buttress that claim, between 25 and 26 June 2013, Baba Jukwa posted from various 
provinces countrywide, reporting on ZANU- PF’s primary elections, raising suspicions that 
this Facebook character could be more than one person. This claim by Baba Jukwa to be 
‘everyone’ further complicates the issue of identity and anonymity of online users. If identities 
and personal interactions are performances, (see Harris 1996, p. ix) the process of physically 
identifying Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa becomes a cumbersome task as evidenced by police 
difficulties in pinning down the real Baba Jukwa. The claims by Mduduzi Mathuthu5, the 
Chronicle editor, that Kudzayi, accused by the police of being Baba Jukwa, was in fact Amai 
Jukwa clearly demonstrates the fluid nature of internet identities which apart from being 
anonymous, are constantly shifting. The anonymity provided by the internet enabled Baba 
Jukwa to embark in what Castells (2007:1) calls “insurgent politics…” in which he implicated 
many high-ranking ZANU- PF, government and military figures, including President Mugabe 
in various crimes and vice. This lent credence to suspicions that Baba Jukwa could be a ZANU- 
PF insider trying to influence the party’s succession politics allegedly pitting Vice President 
Joice Mujuru against and the then Defence minister Emmerson Mnangagwa. 
                                                            
5 http://nehandaradio.com/2014/06/23/jukwas‐short‐history‐mduduzi‐mathuthu/ 
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Amai Jukwa’s page features a bespectacled African woman seated in a high chair, reading from 
some script. Sitting before her, on the floor are a boy and a girl, who appear to be paying 
attention to her. Underneath the picture is a caption ‘Amai Jukwa – loving mother of three.’ 
The high stool upon which the woman (supposedly representing Amai Jukwa) sits is symbolic 
of the echelons of power occupied by ZANU- PF. In the GNU’s lifetime, ZANU-PF appeared 
to be the nexus of political power. Consequently, one can interpret the two children seated on 
the floor as the two MDC formations surviving on the mercies and dictates of the 
‘revolutionary’ mother party-ZANU- PF. Alternatively, one can interpret the two children as 
Zimbabwean citizens benefitting from the party’s land reform and indigenisation policies. 
Furthermore, Amai Jukwa’s posts are monologic, compared to Baba Jukwa’s dialogic tone in 
which he assumes interaction with his followers. For instance, he would begin most of his 
statements like “Zimbabwe, here is what is happening…” or “This is what we are working 
on…” [Authors’ emphasis] which, unlike the dictatorial Amai Jukwa, created a sense of 
community. Baba Jukwa implied a belonging to some virtual community, while Amai Jukwa 
behaved like an authoritarian figure-head, as implied by her avatar and as has generally become 
associated with ZANU-PF’s leadership style. 
The gendered titles of Baba (father) and Amai (mother), may initially suggest that the two are 
spouses. Yet their cyber-clashes indicate that the two share very little in common. If anything, 
they are a querulous family symbolic of the ZANU-PF and MDC partnership in government 
which was often dubbed a ‘marriage of convenience’, and was terminated immediately prior 
to ZANU-PF’s ‘landslide’ victory6 in the July 31 elections.  
Far from coupling with Baba Jukwa, Amai Jukwa constantly refers to President Mugabe as 
‘Daddy Mugabe.’ ‘Daddy’, in Zimbabwe, can be used by women to lovingly address their 
husbands or lovers. It is, in that context, more of an intimate than respectful term. The respectful 
term is ‘Baba’ (father). For instance, on 22 August 2013 Amai Jukwa wrote: “Morning Daddy 
Mugabe. An inauguration hug and an inauguration kiss. Mwaaaaaah”. This discourse is 
symbolic of the intimate manner in which Amai Jukwa defended ZANU- PF and more 
specifically, Mugabe’s political turf. 
Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa: Mirroring political ‘reality’ in Zimbabwe 
                                                            
6 The opposition MDC and the West rejected ZANU PF’s victory arguing that it had rigged the election. 
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Just like traditional media, Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s Facebook pages mirror political 
realities in Zimbabwe. Perhaps, mirroring the widespread assumption that MDC-T enjoyed 
more popular support than ZANU- PF, Baba Jukwa had more ‘Likes’ on his page than Amai 
Jukwa, a fact supported by their followers, such as one on Amai Jukwa’s page: 
What difference can this page deliver? After all makangofanana (you are all the same), 
iwe (you) Amai Jukwa; Zim politics and now this Team Zanu PF 2013. You've one thing 
in common, all of you have failed to attract a substantial number of likes here on 
Facebook. Surely how can you convince Zimbabweans to vote for an 89-year old man 
Zanu PF [sic]. Doesn’t it alarm you here kuti (that) 90% of comments being posted on 
your forum is (sic) always against you? (Amai Jukwa Facebook page 6 July 2013). 
Baba Jukwa posted on a range of themes, such as the impending death of high profile figures, 
revealing the phone numbers of ministers or state security agents. In May 2013, a post by Baba 
Jukwa warned Parliamentarian and former Mines minister, Edward Chindori Chininga of his 
impending death in a road accident. The accident happened a few weeks later and Baba Jukwa 
claimed that Chindori-Chininga was ‘assassinated’ for revealing ‘dirty secrets’ in Zimbabwe’s 
mining sector, allegedly controlled by ZANU- PF stalwarts. In August 2013, Baba Jukwa also 
ominously wrote about National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) general manager, Retired Air 
Commodore Mike Karakadzai a few hours before he died in an accident. Most of the posts 
played-up the long-suspected ZANU-PF factional rifts.  
Amai Jukwa became most active after the elections, posting sometimes up to five times in a 
day, mostly mocking Tsvangirai, either for losing the elections or for his philandering. ‘She’   
wrote extensively about Elizabeth Macheka’s (Tsvangirai’s wife) alleged infidelity, which in 
turn received extensive coverage in the weekly The Sunday Mail. Amai Jukwa labelled the 
couple “Morgan ‘open-zip’ Tsvangirai and Elizabeth ‘open-legs’ Macheka” (Amai Jukwa 
Facebook page 18 August 2013).  
The polarisation of opinion on Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s Facebook pages was mirrored 
in the traditional media. Baba Jukwa was extensively covered in the privately-owned press, 
especially in the Daily News. The Zimbabwean published a weekly column by Baba Jukwa, 
while Amai Jukwa also had a column in The Herald further buttressing Papacharissi’s (n.d) 
arguments on the relationship between citizen and mainstream journalism. Baba and Amai 
Jukwa’s cyber-clashes perpetuated the already polarised media industry in which state-
controlled media were pro-ZANU- PF while the private media were pro-MDC. One can argue 
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that these Facebook posts were reproduced in the mainstream media only to the extent that they 
corresponded with the editorial policies of the same media. For example, the pro-MDC-T Daily 
News published Baba Jukwa’s internet-based poll predicting a Morgan Tsvangirai win just 
before the elections. In cases like this, the facts in these columns were not checked at all. In the 
Daily News example, a realistic analysis would have revealed that the majority of voters in the 
rural areas did not have access to the internet and it would also have revealed that perhaps a 
significant number of those who voted in the poll were Zimbabweans in the Diaspora who had 
no chance of casting their vote at all in the July elections. All this was ignored because the 
paper was openly campaigning for the MDC-T as shown by a piece in their July 30 2013 issue 
in which they gave 89 reasons (President Mugabe was 89 years old) why people should not 
vote for Mugabe. 
Ironically, Amai Jukwa decried this system of reproducing online information without 
verifying its authenticity. On 11 July, Amai Jukwa cited the UK’s Guardian newspaper which 
carried a story7 titled ‘Robert Mugabe holds all the cards in Zimbabwe election’ but two days 
later was up in arms over the same paper’s negative reportage of Mugabe. She wrote:  
This is gross irresponsibility on the part of the Guardian. A document surfaces online, 
you are unable to verify its authenticity but go on to run a story? If the Guardian has a 
correspondent in Zimbabwe I think it is time we send such a person back to London. 
Completely unacceptable! 
As Dahlgren (2005:149) argues “one can raise all of the familiar questions and criteria about 
media output for political communication, including fairness, accuracy, completeness, 
pluralism of views, agenda setting, ideological tendencies, modes of address, and so forth.” 
These questions also apply to the Jukwa Facebook forums. The two’s bias towards one or the 
other party and the media’s tendency to select from these pages only stories that furthered the 
interests of their preferred parties and candidates, gives credence to the claim that, “all 
interactions are mediated; there is no pure, immediate, fully-present, fully-transparent 
encounter” (Dean 2003). The two characters’ political preferences influenced the issues they 
posted on their Facebook pages. The mediation was intended to achieve certain objectives; it 
was never innocent. 
 
                                                            
7 The Guardian article was titled ‘Robert Mugabe plotted Jacob Zuma assassination, document 
claims’. 
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Alternative or sensational media and implications on the public sphere 
The Jukwa phenomenon cannot be entirely attributed to shrinkage of democratic space in 
Zimbabwean media in light of the then recent licensing of new private players in the industry, 
including NewsDay, Southern Eye and The Zimbabwe Mail, and radio stations ZiFM and Star 
FM. Rather, the phenomenon could be seen as epitomising the growing range of alternative 
discourses in Zimbabwe’s political landscape, although in the absence of official 
communication on otherwise sensitive issues, there emerged a parallel market of information 
(see Moyo 2009). This became evident soon after the elections when Baba Jukwa and Amai 
Jukwa went into overdrive, posting poll results from countrywide polling stations. This 
communication thrived in the absence of official announcements of results. The anonymity of 
internet communication meant Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa could subvert electoral laws that 
barred individuals from announcing election results before the Zimbabwe Electoral 
Commission (ZEC) did so. This confirms claims by critics that the internet is a source of 
counter-power and insurgent politics (see Fuchs 2009; Castells 2007). Facebook’s anonymity 
is also the source of its criminality as some of the discourses go beyond reasonable freedom 
and infringe on people’s privacy. For instance, muckraking, as in the case of Baba Jukwa’s 
revelations of ZANU-PF politicians’ alleged HIV statuses and their alleged spreading of the 
same, was outright illegal. However, it could be that when the previously silenced “Other” gets 
the opportunity to be heard in conditions where they are anonymous, they deliberately exert 
the maximum possible embarrassment on the power wielders, the previously ‘untouchables’ 
who, courtesy of the internet, can now be ‘touched’.  
In electoral matters, the Jukwas largely quenched the anxieties of the electorate. The danger 
with this information, however, was that it could not be verified and could be used for malicious 
purposes, vis-à-vis to create a false result and agitate the electorate should official results go 
otherwise. Indeed Baba Jukwa did call for demonstrations to defend the ‘vote’ arguing that 
MDC-T had won but ZANU-PF had rigged the vote.  This shows that social media could be 
used to mobilise social or political movements as what happened in Egypt and Libya in 2011. 
Often, the information on the two Facebook pages was sensational and did not add value to 
readers’ appreciation of the country’s politics. One example was when  Baba Jukwa claimed 
that Vice President Joice Mujuru had told president Mugabe that she was not “prepared to 
address Star Rallies throughout the country because his (Mugabe) supporters in the party 
where (sic) rigged out of the party candidates race by Emmerson Mnangagwa's people” (Baba 
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Jukwa Facebook post 3 July 2013). In another post, he accused then Malawian president, Joyce 
Banda, of conniving with ZANU-PF to rig the elections in return for diamonds. Baba Jukwa 
also published letters that ‘he’ claimed to have been authored by disillusioned military officers. 
The authenticity of the letters could not be verified. This flagrant abuse of journalistic ethics 
and the lack of veracity of information eroded most of the supposed benefits intended by these 
Facebook posts. 
The Jukwa cases also show that social media, just like traditional media, can be used to set an 
agenda or to tell people what to think about. The credibility of this agenda on social media lies 
not so much in the gullibility of users but the existence on the same media, of opinion leaders 
who validate otherwise speculative information. For instance, with the benefit of their 
anonymity, the Jukwas were widely seen as insiders whose knowledge of the happenings in 
Zimbabwean politics was first hand. Furthermore, Facebook users commented on Baba Jukwa 
and Amai Jukwa’s posts, sometimes confirming issues posted and making this information 
more credible and likely to be spread further by word of mouth. In cases where traditional 
media sourced news from the Facebook pages, the net-effect was that of legitimating the 
information posted online. One may, however, observe that both Amai Jukwa and Baba 
Jukwa’s political agendas may have coincided with those of the mainstream media, therefore 
multiplying the intended effect of the Facebook posts. As Sambrook (2005:4) argues “There 
will always be a central place for editorial judgement to be applied…As we open up to 
contributions from the public, we must do so in a way that is consistent with our editorial 
values”. The stories that were published in the mainstream private media (NewsDay and Daily 
News) using Baba Jukwa as a source, were therefore consistent with the papers’ editorial 
policies.  
Baba Jukwa’s agenda was to see a ZANU-PF loss in the elections, as seen in his encouragement 
of those “vakapanduka zvachose” (those that have eternally rebelled). Baba Jukwa and Amai 
Jukwa’s activities on Facebook can, to some extent be seen as transforming the public sphere, 
though an alternative public sphere to the one discussed by Habermas. Dahlgren (2005) terms 
it the ‘cyber transformation’ of the public sphere. The fact that Facebook users that ‘Liked’ the 
pages and those that followed the pages could freely comment on issues discussed, could be 
seen as fostering a public sphere where opinion was unfettered to the extent that these fora 
“facilitate[d] communicative links between citizens and the power holders of society” 
(Dahlgren 2005:48). They enabled citizens to talk back to power. To some extent, the Jukwa 
Facebook pages fostered a virtual communing of ideas in the cyber sphere. Just like citizens 
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communed in coffee-shops and salons in Habermas’ (1989) conceptualisation of the public 
sphere, ‘Netizens’, likewise ‘gathered’ on these Facebook pages to freely debate matters 
affecting them. This analysis, however, must not overemphasize technological deterministic 
assumptions of internet-based communication. Instead, as Papacharissi (n.d:2) observes, they 
should be “traced back to the political, cultural, social and economic environment that brings 
them to life.” In that regard, restrictions in the country’s legislation partially led to the 
emergence of parallel discourses epitomised by Baba Jukwa.  In contrast, Amai Jukwa could 
be viewed as an attempt by the elite to reproduce dominance by neutralizing opponents in the 
alternative public sphere. 
In this alternative public sphere, Baba Jukwa assumed the role of chief protagonist for political 
change as evidenced by his constant calls for action, including a civil rebellion against ZANU-
PF. 
Please Zimbabwe be ready for total actions. This time it's not a kitchen party we are 
fighting till the last drop, we can't allow evil people to manipulate the people's will. We 
are just waiting for the call from Tsvangirai, Welshman [Ncube, MDC leader) and 
[Dumiso] Dabengwa [Zapu leader] to go on streets and show the world what we want. 
Let's unite and fight forever (Facebook page, 1 August 2013).  
To pre-empt rigging in 2013, throughout the election period, Baba Jukwa adopted the role of 
whistle blower, alerting would-be voters of any irregularities that could lead to manipulation 
of the poll. The publicity he created and the opportunity he offered citizens to discuss these 
matters freely could thus be seen as expanding or providing an alternative public sphere. This 
analysis, however, does not necessarily consider the qualitative properties of this public sphere. 
From a qualitative perspective, one can argue that the Jukwas pulverised and trivialised instead 
of enriching the public sphere. Facebook users often used fake identities and abused that 
anonymity to launch attacks on the ‘persons’ of Amai Jukwa and Baba Jukwa. By using 
pseudonyms, internet users could ‘freely’ comment, sometimes using abusive language on their 
subjects of discussion. In several posts, for instance, Amai Jukwa was labelled a prostitute, 
probably on the assumption that since her nom de plume purported ‘her’ to be female, the 
person(s) behind the Facebook page could also be female.  
Discussions on the Facebook pages also marginalised smaller political groups such as the MDC 
led by Welshman Ncube, ZAPU, Mavambo/Kusile and ZANU-Ndonga, among others. It was 
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as if the elections were only being contested by ZANU-PF and MDC-T. From the foregoing it 
can therefore be argued that the supposed expansion of the alternative public sphere did not 
necessarily enhance its quality.  
Conclusions 
It can be argued that Baba Jukwa was an example of what Castells (2007) has termed counter 
power or counter-discourse or the Gramscian counter-hegemony while Amai Jukwa is an 
example of the appropriation of the tools of counter-power by the ruling elite to perpetuate 
their dominance. It can be argued that Baba Jukwa broadened the platform for debate though 
it cannot necessarily be said that the debate was always rational. The ideal public sphere should 
not only be characterised by free entry and free exit but it should also be characterised by 
inclusivity, free and rational debate. However, both Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa ignored the 
smaller political parties. In light of the foregoing it can be argued that in contrast to Hindman 
(2008) who feels that the internet public sphere would be broadened and become more 
representative because of the internet’s lack of barriers to entry, the internet has not necessarily 
broadened the public sphere as evidenced by the sometimes partisan and intolerant discussions 
on Baba Jukwa and Amai Jukwa’s forums. The internet’s potential to liberate or democratize 
the public sphere (see Wang & Bates 2008, p.8) remains just that; a potential. However, there 
exists a symbiotic relationship between the internet and mainstream media even though 
practices of production by both and interaction amongst them confirms claims that any 
encounter and/or reality is diluted by mediation (see Fiske 1987; Dean 2003). 
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